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This study examined how informants’ traits affect how children seek information, trust testimony, and make
inferences about informants’ knowledge. Eighty-one 3- to 6-year-olds and 26 adults completed tasks where
they requested and endorsed information provided by one of two informants with conﬂicting traits (e.g., hon-
esty vs. dishonesty). Participants also completed tasks where they simultaneously considered informants’ traits
and visual access to information when inferring their knowledge and trusting their testimony. Children and
adults preferred to ask and endorse information provided by people who are nice, smart, and honest. More-
over, these traits inﬂuenced the knowledge that young children attributed to informants. Children younger
than 5 years of age reported that people with positive traits were knowledgeable even when they lacked
access to relevant information.
Much of the knowledge that children and adults
hold is derived from information others provide.
From others, we acquire information ranging
from the mundane—today’s date or the weather—
to information that cannot be easily observed or
assessed—the presence of germs, the existence of
God, or the nature of the afterlife (Harris & Koenig,
2006). Given young children’s limited experience
with the world, testimony is a particularly valuable
source of information for them (Gelman, 2009;
Harris, 2007). But not all people are sources of reliable
information. Some people unknowingly offer inac-
curate information because of their own mispercep-
tions or ignorance. Others intentionally (perhaps
malevolently) provide false information. Because of
this variability in informants’ trustworthiness, it is
important for children to be selective in whom they
choose to learn from. The current study examines
how informants’ traits—speciﬁcally, their smart-
ness, kindness, and honesty—affect how children
seek information, trust testimony, and make infer-
ences about informants’ knowledge.
Preschool-age children appreciate that people
possess traits—intangible, stable dispositions that
guide thinking and behavior (for a review, see
Heyman, 2009)—and indeed young children can
use others’ traits to predict their psychological
experiences and behavior (Heyman & Gelman,
1999, 2000; Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). How
children consider informants’ traits when acquiring
knowledge is a critical issue to address because the
people from whom children typically learn are people
with whom children have extensive experience—
parents, friends, teachers—and thus children have
substantial information about those individuals’ sta-
ble characteristics. Harris (2007) argues that chil-
dren create “cognitive proﬁles” of informants:
They form a global impression of each individ-
ual, regarding some as more epistemically trust-
worthy than others. We assume that this global
impression regarding any given informant is
based on some kind of aggregated metric. Infor-
mation about the informant’s past inaccuracy,
ignorance, uncertainty, or apparent idiosyncrasy
is fed into that proﬁle. (Harris, 2007, p. 138)
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Much of the recent work on children’s trust in
testimony examines how one potentially trait-
related characteristic—informants’ accuracy—affects
the way that children learn from others. In one
standard task, children are shown two characters,
typically hand puppets or real people on video
(Clément, Koenig, & Harris, 2004; Koenig, Clément,
& Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005), who differ
in their demonstrated accuracy (e.g., their correct or
incorrect naming of common objects) and children
choose to ask one character to learn something new
(e.g., the name of a novel object). Then both charac-
ters offer conﬂicting information (testimony) and
children choose which character’s testimony they
believe by endorsing one or the other. When learn-
ing the names of novel objects, 3- and 4-year-olds
prefer to ask previously accurate informants
(Koenig et al., 2004). Four-year-olds additionally pre-
fer to endorse object labels provided by accurate
informants (Clément et al., 2004; Koenig et al., 2004).
Although 3-year-olds often do not preferentially
endorse accurate informants’ testimony in these
tasks, those who keep better track of informants’
prior accuracy more often endorse testimony pro-
vided by more accurate informants (Koenig et al.,
2004). Three-year-olds also selectively endorse infor-
mants when presented more data about informants’
tendencies. In cases where young children see one
informant is consistently accurate across three or
four instances, and the other informant is inaccurate
across three or four instances, even 3-year-olds trust
testimony provided by the previously accurate
informant (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Pasquini,
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007; Scoﬁeld &
Behrend, 2008). However, if both informants are
wrong at least once (e.g., one is correct 25% of
the time whereas the other is correct 75% of the
time), 3-year-olds no longer demonstrate selective
trust; 4-year-olds do (Pasquini et al., 2007). Thus,
3-year-olds in particular seem to require consistent
evidence about informants’ tendencies (in this case,
their accuracy) in order to develop a proﬁle of an
“accurate” or “inaccurate” informant.
Being accurate or inaccurate is not a trait per se,
and this is something that even preschoolers realize.
For example, preschoolers are willing to trust
recently inaccurate informants if their inaccuracies
stem from ignorance or false beliefs (Nurmsoo &
Robinson, 2009; Robinson & Nurmsoo, 2009)—in
these cases, it is clear that inaccuracy does not indi-
cate a broad, trait-like mental shortcoming. How-
ever, systematic accuracy might be related to
underlying traits, such as intelligence. Given their
inductive potential (Heyman, 2009) traits may exert
a particularly powerful inﬂuence on children’s trust
in certain informants; however, this possibility is
largely unaddressed in the literature. The aforemen-
tioned studies collectively show that the stronger
the evidence about informants’ systematic accuracy,
the more heavily children weigh that tendency
when trusting testimony. Thus, characters’ endur-
ing, underlying traits may be especially effective in
eliciting selective trust from young children. These
considerations framed our methods in the current
study. Children saw two informants who differed
in the accuracy of their prior testimony (as in
Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005). Impor-
tantly, children also received additional information
about these informants’ traits that might inﬂuence
the quality of their testimony; for example, the
informants were assigned the trait labels “smart”
and “not smart,” we described what both of those
labels mean, then reminded children that the infor-
mants possess those traits and checked that chil-
dren understood.
In addition to smartness, we examined whether
and when young children take into account other
traits, speciﬁcally kindness and honesty. Kindness
(being mean or nice) was included because it is a
trait understood even by young preschoolers; they
appreciate that nice and mean people engage in dif-
ferent behaviors and have different motives (Hey-
man & Gelman, 1999, 2000). Although, for adults,
kindness does not necessarily reﬂect the quality of
one’s epistemic states, because it has an emotional
component and because it may inﬂuence children’s
global evaluations of individuals, kindness may
nonetheless inﬂuence children’s selective trust. Hon-
esty has strong emotional appeal as well, and is
also a characteristic that young children are begin-
ning to understand. Preschoolers are sensitive to
statements that are lies and in some studies even
3-year-olds understand lying as a psychological
process (Siegal & Peterson, 1996, 1998). In addition
to its potential emotional appeal, honesty may
directly reﬂect the quality of information someone
is likely to produce, so it is a particularly important
trait to consider when assessing testimony. Con-
ceivably, whether informants are generally dishon-
est (or honest) could inﬂuence young children’s
willingness to trust their testimony.
In the prior work examining the inﬂuence of
informants’ kindness and honesty on children’s
trust, Mascaro and Sperber (2009, Studies 2 and 3)
had a single informant (a frog puppet) provide
young children with erroneous testimony about the
location of candy. In one study, the informant was
described as a “Big liar! It always tells lies.” In the
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other study, the informant was described as “Very
mean! It does not want you to ﬁnd the sweet!” In
both studies, children were presented two boxes
and the informant made a claim that the candy was
in one of the boxes. It was not until age 4 years in
Study 2 (and still later in Study 3) that children
avoided the box indicated by the deceptive frog.
However, these results may not reﬂect children’s
consideration of informants’ honesty in particular.
In their Study 2, children were warned about the
informant (“Watch out!”) as well as told he was a
liar, so it is not clear if 4-year-olds’ appropriate
choices reﬂect the warning, the lying, or both.
Moreover, these results likely reﬂect young chil-
dren’s more general difﬁculty disregarding claims
or instructions given by a single informant, regard-
less of his characteristics. This tendency is particu-
larly strong when informants provide spoken
information (Jaswal, Croft, Setia, & Cole, 2010;
Reed, Pien, & Rothbart, 1984; Strommen, 1973; Van-
derbilt, Liu, & Heyman, 2011). Prior studies seem
to indicate that children’s sensitivity to characteris-
tics of informants (e.g., accuracy, age) is most
clearly demonstrated when children choose
between the conﬂicting testimony of two informants
(Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig et al., 2004; Pasquini
et al., 2007). Indeed, when Mascaro and Sperber
(2009) described a single deceptive informant as
“mean” in their Study 3, preschoolers still followed
his testimony, even though 3-year-olds preferred
the testimony of a nice informant (rather than the
testimony of a mean informant) in their Study 1.
Thus, almost no research has addressed children’s
appreciation for informants’ honesty when learning
from others, and the available data may underesti-
mate children’s understanding. Here, we employ a
standard testimony paradigm—having children
choose between honest and dishonest informants
who offer conﬂicting information—to examine
whether young children weigh informants’ honesty
when learning from others.
In summary, we comprehensively compare the
inﬂuence of several different traits—smartness, kind-
ness, and honesty—on how children seek and endorse
information provided by others. All of these traits are
worth considering when learning from others, but the
developmental point at which children begin to take
them into consideration may differ.
Of note, young children’s performance in prior
studies varies depending on the nature of the task:
including whether there is a single or multiple
informants (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009) and, of
particular relevance to the current study, if children
are to ask versus endorse informants. For example,
as Koenig et al. (2004) demonstrated, 3-year-olds
prefer to ask a recently accurate (vs. inaccurate)
person for information, but are equally likely to
endorse the two informants’ subsequent testimony.
This may be because the two tasks differ in what
they assess, with the former potentially measuring
a global attraction (or aversion) to an informant or
a desire to afﬁliate with one informant over the
other, and the latter a more direct measure of chil-
dren’s consideration of the actual information that
people offer. This distinction is especially important
to consider when informants have positive and neg-
ative traits. Thus, we include both types of ques-
tions in the current study: ask (Who will you ask
for information, X or Y?) and endorsement (Do you
believe X’s or Y’s testimony?).
Preference for Information Versus Desire to Afﬁliate
The afﬁliation possibility, just discussed, deserves
further attention. Some have challenged the notion
that children’s choice of informants and information
on standard testimony tasks actually reﬂects chil-
dren’s consideration of informants’ epistemic states
(e.g., Lucas & Lewis, 2010). One alternative possibil-
ity is that children’s responses to both ask and
endorsement tasks reveal nothing more than a gen-
eral attraction to certain people, rather than an
appreciation for the quality of information the peo-
ple have to offer. Several studies in which accurate
informants are pitted against inaccurate informants
demonstrate that children’s preference for testimony
is not based on a general attraction to accurate
informants (e.g., Birch et al., 2008; Jaswal & Neely,
2006). However, informants in the current study
have strongly valenced traits (e.g., meanness and
niceness) which may more strongly inﬂuence infor-
mants’ global attractiveness to children. Thus, in
addition to comparing children’s performance
across the ask and endorsement tasks, we also
directly assess children’s general attraction to each
informant by having children report whether they
would like to be friends with each informant. This
allowed us to assess relations between children’s
general attraction to certain people and their ten-
dency to ask and endorse information provided by
those same people.
Even if not driven solely by a general attraction
to certain informants, perhaps initially children
weigh informants’ more global characteristics (e.g.,
traits) over more proximate factors (e.g., informants’
current epistemic states) when deciding whose
information to trust. Alternatively, as we discuss
next, informants’ more enduring, global qualities
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may inﬂuence children’s inferences about infor-
mants’ epistemic states, and this in turn may inﬂu-
ence whose testimony children trust.
Considering Informants’ Knowledge
One goal of research on children’s trust in testi-
mony is to understand when children appreciate
that certain people possess better knowledge than
others. Theoretically, the nature of informants’ traits
may not matter if they are ignorant—if they lack the
knowledge that a learner wants to acquire. An
ignorant person’s testimony may be untrustworthy,
regardless of whether he is intelligent, kind, or hon-
est. However, traits carry strong inductive potential
and may lead children astray when making infer-
ences about epistemic states. Because children often
form global evaluations of individuals (as good or
bad) across multiple domains (Alvarez, Ruble, &
Bolger, 2001; Cain, Heyman, & Walker, 1997; Stipek
& Daniels, 1990), positive traits may suggest to
young children that informants are generally
knowledgeable even when they are not. So, in
examining their understanding of the relevance of
various traits for testimony, it is important also to
assess children’s understanding of informants’
knowledge.
Prior work indicates that young children are
appropriately sensitive to informants’ knowledge in
certain scenarios. For example, children as young as
3 years of age are less willing to believe the testi-
mony of someone who is ignorant because he lacks
visual access to relevant information (Robinson,
Champion, & Mitchell, 1999). If faced with a sce-
nario in which one informant accurately labels com-
mon objects and the other informant consistently
says “I do not know,” 3-year-olds prefer to ask the
accurate informant for the label of a new object,
and 4-year-olds prefer to ask and endorse labels pro-
vided by the (thus far) accurate informant (Koenig
& Harris, 2005). Four-year-olds are also more
accepting of information provided by informants
who are conﬁdent in their knowledge (Moore, Bryant,
& Furrow, 1989). For example, they believe
information provided by someone who says, “I
know it is in the red box” versus someone who
says, “I guess it is in the red box” (see also Jaswal
& Malone, 2007; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001). Build-
ing on these beginnings, more information is
needed about how informants’ access to knowledge
affects children’s trust in testimony, particularly in
relation to their appreciation for traits such as
smartness, which may also convey to young chil-
dren information about knowledge.
In the current study, our approach to these
issues is to assess how children simultaneously con-
sider informants’ traits and their access to context-
speciﬁc information. In real life, these factors do not
always converge: A “good” person is sometimes
ignorant; a “bad” person may be knowledgeable
(e.g., an accessory to a crime). This interplay
between traits and knowledge may be problematic
for preschoolers, and understanding how children
negotiate such situations may provide important
information about the development of trust in testi-
mony. For example, if preschoolers prefer the testi-
mony of well-informed people (e.g., Robinson et al.,
1999), they may continue to favor their testimony
even if those informants possess negative traits. In
contrast, certain traits may overinﬂuence children’s
inferences about the quality of informants’ knowl-
edge and also their subsequent decisions about
who to trust. Moreover, how children simulta-
neously weigh informants’ traits and knowledge
access may vary depending upon the trait. For
example, smartness may be weighted more heavily
than niceness, because smartness links more
directly to knowledge states. To examine these
as-yet-untested possibilities, we asked children to
decide between the testimony of positive-trait infor-
mants who are poorly informed versus negative-
trait informants who are well informed.
In summary, the current study is designed to
address four questions: (a) How do informants’
traits—speciﬁcally, their honesty, kindness, and
smartness—inﬂuence young children’s choice of
informants and trust in their testimony? (b) Is chil-
dren’s preference for informants with certain traits
based solely on a desire to afﬁliate with those infor-
mants? (c) How do informants’ traits inﬂuence chil-
dren’s inferences about their knowledge? and (d)
How do children simultaneously weigh informants’
traits and their knowledge when trusting
testimony?
Method
Participants
Participants included 94 children between 3 and
6 years of age. Of these children, six were not
included in our analyses because they ended the
interview session early (three 3-year-olds, two 4-
year-olds, and one 5-year-old) and another seven
(six 3-year-olds and one 4-year-old) were excluded
because they failed to remember which trait corre-
sponded to each of the characters. The ﬁnal sample
consisted of 81 children, including twenty-ﬁve
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3-year-olds (14 girls, 11 boys; range = 34.57–
48.77 months, M = 41.91), thirty-two 4-year-olds
(12 girls, 20 boys; range = 49.20–59.83 months,
M = 54.58), and twenty-four 5- and 6-year-olds (11
girls, 13 boys; range = 61.03–82.50 months,
M = 69.77). Children were interviewed for approxi-
mately 20 min in a quiet, familiar room in their
school. Children attended schools in a Midwestern
university town, were primarily White, and were of
middle to upper-middle socioeconomic status.
When parents gave permission, interviews were
audio recorded. To assess what a mature pattern of
responses would be for our tasks, 26 adults (15
women, 11 men; age range = 18 to 79 years,
M = 34.77) completed an online version of the
study with identical characters, scenarios, and
questions.
Measures and Procedure
Children heard three pairs of stories (presented
in story books) in which two pictured characters
exhibited contrasting traits: Honest–dishonest, nice–
mean, and smart–not smart. The six stories and pic-
tures are presented in the Appendix. To maximize
children’s understanding of these characters’ traits
as enduring, stable qualities and not ﬂeeting char-
acteristics, children were given multiple converging
pieces of information about each character. For
each character, children were given a trait label
(e.g., “Sam is smart”), description of the trait (e.g.,
“Sam is a boy who gives right answers”), scenario
(e.g., Sam correctly identifying that an animal is a
frog), and reminder about the trait (e.g., “Remem-
ber, Sam is smart”). Interviewers were careful to
use a similar intonation during the presentation of
all characters. The order in which the trait pairs
were presented, the order in which characters were
presented within pairs, and characters’ appear-
ance/name within pairs were counterbalanced. For
each trait pair, children were shown laminated
drawings of both characters and were asked to
recall which trait corresponds to each character
(e.g., “Which one is smart, Sam or Noah?” and
“Which one is not smart, Sam or Noah?”). These
memory checks were administered twice for each
pair: immediately after a pair was introduced and
half-way through the set of questions for that pair.
Corrective feedback was provided when necessary.
Children who were incorrect for both memory
checks for any of the traits were excluded from
analyses.
Following the presentation of each character,
children were asked whether they wanted to be
friends with him (afﬁliation questions). For each of
the three trait pairs, children were given three
tasks (numbered below as 1, 2, 3), each containing
two elements. (1) Object naming: (a) asking one of
the two informants about the name of a novel
object, (b) endorsing one informant’s testimony
about the object’s name; (2) Box contents: (a) ask-
ing one of the two informants about the contents
of a box that both characters looked inside, (b)
endorsing one informant’s testimony about the
box’s contents; (3) Knowledge: (a) judging which
character is knowledgeable about the contents of a
closed box when only one character (the negative-
trait character) has looked in the box, (b) endorsing
testimony from one of the two informants about
the contents of the closed box. The order of the
three tasks was counterbalanced, and within trait
pairs, location/presentation order (left/ﬁrst or
right/second) was counterbalanced. For all of these
tasks, characters were presented as drawings on
laminated cards (the same cards used for the mem-
ory checks described above). Characters were
voiced by the experimenter and their actions (e.g.,
approaching and opening boxes) were illustrated
by the experimenter manually moving the draw-
ings. Additional details of these procedures are
provided below.
Afﬁliation. To assess children’s desire to afﬁliate
with each character, following each character’s
introduction, children were asked, “Would you like
to be friends with (character’s name)?”
Object naming. Children were shown a picture of
a novel object situated between the two informants
and were asked, “Do you know what this is
called?” The majority of the children said “No.”
Children were then told, “You can ask (ﬁrst infor-
mant) or (second informant) what this is called.
Who do you want to ask?” Both characters offered
a label and children were asked: “What do you
think this is called, (ﬁrst informant’s label) or (second
informant’s label)?”
Box contents (open box). Children were shown an
open box (with the opening facing away from the
child) and were asked, “Do you know what is
inside this box?” Most children replied “No.” Chil-
dren were then told, “(First informant) and (second
informant) are going to look in the box.” Both char-
acters leaned over the box and children were told,
“Let us ﬁnd out what is inside. Who do you want
to ask, (ﬁrst informant) or (second informant)?”
Both characters offered an answer (the name of a
familiar object) and children were asked, “What do
you think is inside, (ﬁrst informant’s answer) or
(second informant’s answer)?”
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Knowledge (closed box). For each trait pair, chil-
dren also received a task in which the negative-trait
character (dishonest, mean, not smart) looked inside
a box, and the positive-trait character (honest, nice,
smart) did not. So the valence of the trait conﬂicted
with the informants’ access to knowledge. For each
trait-pair, children were shown a closed box and
were asked, “Do you know what is inside this
closed box?” and “Can you see inside this box?”
Most children answered “No” to both questions.
Next, children were told: “(Positive-trait character)
and (negative-trait character) have never ever seen
inside this closed box before. Now, (positive-trait
character) picks up the closed box, walks, and puts
it down over here. (Negative-trait character) opens
the box, looks inside, and then closes the box.”
Children were then asked the focal question: “Who
knows what is inside the box, (positive-trait charac-
ter) or (negative-trait character)?” For each trait
pair, the order in which the characters acted on the
box was counterbalanced.
In order to examine how children simultaneously
weigh informants’ traits and their access to knowl-
edge, we had children choose between testimony
offered by the two informants: negative-trait infor-
mants with access to knowledge and positive-trait
informants without access to knowledge. Thus,
following children’s decisions about the informants’
knowledge in this task, both characters made claims
about the box’s supposed contents (offering the
name of a familiar object), and children were asked,
“What do you think is inside, (ﬁrst informant’s
answer) or (second informant’s answer)?”
Results
Preliminary analyses revealed no gender differences
in children’s performance on our tasks. Thus, data
from girls and boys were combined in the following
analyses.
Asking Informants for Information
We ﬁrst report children’s decisions to seek infor-
mation from certain people. Children’s decisions to
ask certain informants for information were compa-
rable when learning the name of the novel object
and when learning the contents of the open box
that both informants looked inside. Thus, children’s
performance was averaged across the two tasks.
For each trait pair, children could earn a score rang-
ing from 0% (never asked the positive-trait charac-
ter) to 100% (asked the positive-trait character on
both tasks). Figure 1 depicts children’s decisions to
seek information from each of the positive-trait
informants. An initial 3 (trait) 9 3 (age group) anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) examining children’s
decisions to ask the informants with positive traits
(i.e., the honest, nice, and smart informants)
revealed a signiﬁcant effect of age group, F(2,
78) = 5.17, p < .01, but no signiﬁcant effect of trait
or interaction between age group and trait. Five-
and six-year-olds (M = 95%, SD = 13%) asked the
positive-trait informants signiﬁcantly more often
than did 3-year-olds (M = 77%, SD = 24%, p < .01
according to Tukey’s honestly signiﬁcant difference
[HSD] pairwise comparisons), and marginally more
often than did 4-year-olds (M = 83%, SD = 23%,
p = .07 according to Tukey HSD pairwise compari-
sons).
Analyses within each age group revealed that
when presented informants who possessed stable
underlying traits, children as young as 3 years
preferred to ask the nice (vs. mean) informant:
3-year-olds, t(24) = 3.36, p < .01; 4-year-olds, t(31) =
7.00, p < .001; and 5- to 6-year-olds, t(23) = 12.69,
p < .001. More novel to our study was the inclusion
of a pair of informants who differed in their smart-
ness and another pair who differed in their honesty.
We found that 3-year-olds, t(24) = 3.38, p < .01; 4-
year-olds, t(31) = 6.17, p < .001; and 5- to 6-year-
olds, t(23) = 15.91, p < .001, asked the smart (vs.
not smart) informant above chance, and that chil-
dren as young as 3 years also preferred to seek
information from the honest (vs. dishonest) infor-
mant: 3-year-olds, t(24) = 5.20, p < .001; 4-year-olds,
t(31) = 4.72, p < .001; and 5- to 6-year-olds,
t(23) = 15.91, p < .001. Thus, informants’ smartness,
kindness, and honesty all signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
who young children choose to learn from, and the
inﬂuence of these traits increases throughout the
preschool years.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
3 Years 4 Years 5-6 Years
Age Group
Ask Smart
Ask Nice
Ask Honest
Figure 1. Percentage of decisions to ask the positive-trait charac-
ters (smart, nice, and honest) for information, per age group.
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Endorsing Informants’ Testimony
As noted in the Introduction, asking one infor-
mant over another may be a measure of a desire to
afﬁliate as much as an evaluation of testimony and
particularly if children are given trait information
about the informants. Thus, it is important to also
consider endorsement—a task that might more
directly gauge children’s appreciation for the qual-
ity of the information rather than for the informants
themselves. For each trait pair, for both object-nam-
ing and box-contents tasks, after children chose to
ask one informant, both informants offered testi-
mony (labels for the novel object or names of the
object contained in the box) and children endorsed
one informant’s testimony. Children’s decisions
about which informant’s testimony they trusted
were comparable in both tasks, so we again aver-
aged children’s performance across the two tasks.
For each trait pair, children could earn a score
ranging from 0% (never endorsed positive-trait
character’s testimony) to 100% (endorsed positive-
trait character’s testimony on both tasks).
Figure 2 illustrates children’s decisions to
endorse testimony provided by each of the posi-
tive-trait informants. An initial 3 (trait) 9 3 (age
group) ANOVA assessed children’s endorsement of
testimony provided by the positive-trait informants.
This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant effect of age
group, F(2, 78) = 10.91, p < .001, but no signiﬁcant
effect of trait or interaction between age group and
trait. Five- and 6-year-olds (M = 96%, SD = 14%)
endorsed the positive-trait informants’ testimony
signiﬁcantly more often than did 3-year-olds
(M = 67%, SD = 27%, p < .001 according to Tukey
HSD pairwise comparisons) and 4-year-olds
(M = 74%, SD = 24%, p < .01 according to Tukey
HSD pairwise comparisons).
Considering ﬁrst nice versus mean informants,
4-year-olds, t(31) = 2.55, p < .05, and 5- to 6-year-
olds, t(23) = 11.00, p < .001, endorsed the informa-
tion provided by the nice informant above chance,
and 3-year-olds tended in that direction, t(24) =
1.66, p = .11. More novel to our study was the
inclusion of informants who differed in their smart-
ness and honesty. When smartness was presented
as a stable underlying trait, children as young as
3 years of age endorsed testimony provided by the
smart (vs. not smart) informant above chance:
3-year-olds, t(24) = 2.32, p < .05; 4-year-olds, t(31)
= 7.19, p < .001; and 5- to 6-year-olds, t(23) = 23.00,
p < .001. Moreover, children as young as 3 years of
age preferred testimony provided by the honest (vs.
dishonest) informant above chance: (3-year-olds,
t(24) = 2.83, p < .01; 4-year-olds, t(31) = 3.48,
p < .01; and 5- to 6-year-olds, t(23) = 12.69,
p < .001. Though 3-year-olds did not endorse the
nice informant’s testimony above chance, their pref-
erence for his testimony did not differ signiﬁcantly
from their preference for the smart or honest infor-
mant’s testimony, F(2, 23) = .17, ns. In summary,
informants’ smartness, honesty, and (to a lesser
extent) their kindness inﬂuence children’s trust in
testimony. These effects emerge as early as age 3
and become more pronounced throughout the pre-
school years.
If children’s decisions to ask an informant were
inﬂuenced by their general attraction to him with-
out regard for his epistemic states, this might be
especially the case for a trait such as niceness (kind-
ness). Indeed, with regard to the least epistemically
relevant trait, kindness, children were more likely
to ask the nice informant (85%) than they were
to endorse his subsequent testimony (75%),
t(80) = 2.15, p < .05. In contrast, for smartness and
honesty, children’s decisions about whose testi-
mony to endorse were equivalent in frequency to
their decisions about who to ask—children were
equally likely to ask the smart informant (84%) and
to endorse his testimony (81%), t(80) = .74, ns, and
were equally likely to ask the honest informant
(85%) and to endorse his testimony (78%), t(80) =
1.43, ns. These data are relevant for an “afﬁliation”
hypothesis, which we examined more directly by
asking children whether they would like to be
friends with each of the characters.
Afﬁliation with Informants
As shown in Figure 3, 4- through 6-year-olds
wanted to be friends with all of the positive-trait
characters (smart, nice, honest), but not with any
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Figure 2. Percentage of decisions to endorse information pro-
vided by the positive-trait characters (smart, nice, and honest),
per age group.
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of the negative-trait characters (not smart, mean, dis-
honest). Three-year-olds exhibited a different pat-
tern. Like the older children, 3-year-olds wanted to
be friends with the nice character but not with the
mean character. However, in contrast to older chil-
dren, roughly half of the 3-year-olds wanted to be
friends with informants who were dishonest or not
smart. Further, there was no statistical difference in
3-year-olds’ decisions to be friends with the honest
versus the dishonest character, v2(1) = 1.50, ns.
This pattern of results provides a direct test of
the afﬁliation hypothesis. Suppose children’s trust
merely reﬂects a desire to afﬁliate with or a general
attraction to certain informants. Then, given 3-year-
olds’ overwhelming desire to afﬁliate with the nice
(and not the mean) informant and the minimal
difference in their desire to afﬁliate with the smart
(vs. not smart) informant or with the honest (vs.
dishonest) informant, they should selectively trust
nice over mean informants but show a different
pattern of trust for the smart–not smart pair and
the honest-dishonest pair. However, the 3-year-olds
were equally willing to ask and to endorse informa-
tion from the nice, smart, and honest characters:
ask, F(2, 23) = .38, ns, and endorse: F(2, 23) = .17,
ns.
More generally, across all participants, a sizable
number of children (n = 19) reported not wanting to
be friends with the honest character (often indicating
that they chose to not be friends with him because he
violated a social norm by breaking a window). If
children’s trust simply reﬂects a desire to afﬁliate
with or general attraction to the honest (vs. dishon-
est) character, then these children should trust the
honest character less than children who did want to
be his friend (n = 62). However, these two groups of
children were equally likely to ask the honest infor-
mant, t(79) = .96, ns, and to endorse his testimony,
t(79) = 1.50, ns. Moreover, children’s preference to
ask and endorse information provided by the honest
informant was above chance even for children who
did not want to be friends with him: ask, t(18) = 3.64,
p < .01, and endorse, t(18) = 2.11, p < .05.
Finally, for each age group, we conducted cor-
relations between children’s desire to be friends
with positive-trait informants (a score of 0–3) and
negative-trait informants (a score of 0–3) on the one
hand, and their tendency to ask and endorse the
positive-trait informants on the other. Among
3-year-olds, many of whom chose to be friends
with positive- and negative-trait informants, friend-
ship choices were unrelated to their decisions to
ask and to endorse the positive-trait informants.
Among older children, who typically only wanted
to be friends with positive-trait informants, friend-
ship choices were also unrelated to their endorse-
ment of the positive-trait informants’ testimony. In
these analyses, friendship choice was only related
to older children’s decisions about who to ask for
information: Children who wanted to be friends
with fewer negative-trait characters were more
likely to ask the positive-trait informants for infor-
mation: 4-year-olds, r(30) = .56, p < .001, and 5- to
6-year-olds, r(22) = .66, p < .001. In summary, it is
unlikely that children’s trust in testimony in the
current study solely reﬂects an overwhelming gen-
eral attraction to these positive characters or a
general aversion to the negative characters.
Considering Informants’ Knowledge
Potentially, others’ traits may inﬂuence more
than just children’s decisions about whose testi-
mony they should seek and endorse. Given their
strong inductive potential, traits may inﬂuence the
very knowledge children attribute to informants.
We examined this possibility with the knowledge
task in which the negative-trait characters looked
inside a closed box (so they had knowledge of the
box’s contents) and the positive-trait characters did
not look in the box (so they were ignorant about
the box’s contents). Thus, the quality of knowledge
conﬂicted with the valence of the trait. Children
were asked which character knows what is inside
the box. Across the entire sample, correct attribu-
tions of knowledge to the negative-trait characters
did not vary between the three trait pairs
(Cochran’s Q = .267, ns). Thus, we averaged across
all three trait pairs, so children could earn scores
ranging from 0% (never attributed knowledge to
negative-trait characters) to 100% (attributed
knowledge to all three negative-trait characters).
Figure 4 depicts children’s correct attributions of
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Figure 3. Percentage of children who chose to be friends with
each of the characters, per age group.
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knowledge to the negative-trait characters. A one-
way ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant difference in
attributions of knowledge between the three age
groups, F(2, 78) = 5.91, p < .01. Four-year-olds and
5- to 6-year-olds attributed knowledge to the nega-
tive-trait characters signiﬁcantly more than did
3-year-olds (ps = .05 and .003, respectively, accord-
ing to Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons). Across
the whole sample, there was an age-graded increase
in correct attributions of knowledge to the negative-
trait characters, r(79) = .34, p < .01.
In prior studies, when characters do not possess
traits, children as young as 3 years attribute knowl-
edge to characters who perceive information, but
not to those who do not perceive the information
(e.g., Pratt & Bryant, 1990). However, our 3-year-olds
often reported, above chance, that the positive-trait
characters knew the contents of the closed box,
even though those characters never looked inside
the box, t(24) = 3.39, p < .01. Four-year-olds per-
formed at chance, t(31) = 0.00, ns. The oldest group
as a whole performed accurately across 62% of the
trials, but this was no different from chance,
t(23) = 1.46, ns. Note that our oldest group included
children ranging in age from 5 years to nearly
7 years. Inspection of the data suggested that the
very oldest children were consistently accurate on
this task. To conﬁrm this, we examined the oldest
20% of our sample (n = 16; age range = 63.50–
82.50 months). These children accurately attributed
knowledge to the negative-trait characters for 77%
of the trials, and their performance was signiﬁ-
cantly above chance, t(15) = 3.01, p < .01.
This initial portion of the knowledge task con-
cerned simply children’s attribution of knowledge
to the characters. A further important question
concerns children’s endorsement of the testimony
provided by the positive-trait/ignorant versus
negative-trait/knowledgeable characters. Following
children’s decisions about the informants’ knowl-
edge, for each trait pair, both informants provided
testimony about the closed box’s contents and chil-
dren chose to endorse information provided by one
of the informants. One child, a 3-year-old, did not
provide an answer to this question for the honest–
dishonest pair. An initial one-way ANOVA assess-
ing the frequency with which children endorsed the
positive-trait (though ignorant) informants’ testi-
mony revealed no signiﬁcant difference between
the three age groups, F(2, 78) = 1.75, ns (3-year-
olds: 57%; 4-year-olds: 71%; 5- to 6-year-olds: 71%).
Children’s trust in the positive-trait informants’
testimony depended upon whether they attributed
knowledge to those informants. This pattern was
especially clear for nice–mean and honest–dishonest
pairs of informants. Children who correctly identi-
ﬁed that the mean informant was knowledgeable
were less likely to endorse the nice informant’s sub-
sequent testimony, v2(1) = 5.19, p < .05) and chil-
dren who identiﬁed that the dishonest informant
was knowledgeable were less likely to endorse the
honest informant’s testimony, v2(1) = 6.47, p = .01.
Analyzed separately, children who incorrectly attrib-
uted knowledge to the nice and honest informants
endorsed their subsequent testimony at levels above
chance (nice: 77%, binomial p < .001; honest: 77%,
binomial p < .001). In contrast, children who were
correct in not granting knowledge to the nice and
honest informants did not endorse their testimony
above chance (nice: 53%, binomial p = .871; honest:
50%, binomial p = 1.00). A different pattern emerged
for the smart-not-smart pair. Children were equally
trusting of the smart character’s testimony regard-
less of whether they understood that he lacked the
critical knowledge, v2(1) = 1.20, ns; collectively chil-
dren preferred his testimony 69% of the time, signiﬁ-
cantly above chance (binomial p < .001).
In summary, trust in informants with positive
traits was mitigated among children who could
identify when those informants lacked relevant
knowledge. However one trait in particular—infor-
mants’ smartness—continued to weigh heavily in
children’s trust in testimony, even among children
who could identify when a smart informant lacked
critical knowledge.
Adult Judgments
In order to validate our intuitions about what a
mature pattern of responses would be for these
tasks, 26 adults answered identical questions. In the
object-naming and the box-contents tasks, these
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Figure 4. Attributions of knowledge to the negative-trait charac-
ters, who had perceptual access to relevant information.
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adults overwhelmingly preferred to ask the posi-
tive-trait informants (nice: M = 100%, SD = 0%;
smart: M = 98%, SD = 10%; honest: M = 100%,
SD = 0%) and overwhelmingly endorsed their testi-
mony (nice: M = 100%, SD = 0%; smart: M = 96%,
SD = 14%; honest: M = 100%, SD = 0%). For the
knowledge task, adults accurately attributed knowl-
edge to the negative-trait informants on 85% of the
trials, signiﬁcantly above chance, t(25) = 5.35,
p < .001. When faced with trusting the testimony of
either the positive-trait/ignorant or negative-trait/
knowledgeable informants, adults trusted the posi-
tive-trait/ignorant informants at chance (M = 49%,
SD = 37%).
These data from adults also provided a point of
comparison for our oldest children, to determine if
our 5- and 6-year-olds were exhibiting an adult-like
pattern of responses. Indeed, for the standard ask
and endorsement questions (when learning about
the novel object and about the contents of the open
box), adults’ responses were not signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from the 5- and 6-year-olds’ responses. Thus
their data looked essentially identical to that from
the 5- to 6-year-olds in Figures 1 and 2. Moreover,
for the knowledge task, adults’ attribution of
knowledge to the negative-trait informants was not
signiﬁcantly different from the 16 oldest children’s
knowledge attributions. The only difference
between the oldest children and adults was that
adults were less trusting of the positive-trait/igno-
rant informants (M = 49%, SD = 37%) than were
the oldest children (M = 71%, SD = 36%), t(48) =
2.13, p < .05.
Discussion
Much of our knowledge is acquired from others—
parents, friends, experts, and teachers. These indi-
viduals not only differ in their knowledge but also
in many other regards, such as their appearance,
age, and personality. The extent to which children
weigh some of these factors when learning from
others has recently received enormous empirical
attention (for reviews, see Gelman, 2009; Harris,
2007). In the current study, we assessed the inﬂu-
ence of informants’ traits on how children seek
information, trust testimony, and make inferences
about informants’ knowledge. We additionally
examined how both informants’ traits and their
access to knowledge simultaneously inﬂuence chil-
dren’s trust in testimony.
Our interest in the inﬂuence of informants’ traits
on children’s epistemic trust was motivated, in part,
by recent studies which collectively demonstrate
that, if presented enough consistent data about
informants’ tendencies, children as young as 3 years
selectively trust informants based upon their recent
accuracy (e.g., Birch et al., 2008; Pasquini et al.,
2007; Scoﬁeld & Behrend, 2008). Some have rea-
soned that children use informants’ recent accuracy
to construct “cognitive proﬁles” regarding infor-
mants’ epistemic trustworthiness (Harris, 2007). If
provided enough converging information about an
informant’s accuracy, conceivably children may
even begin to infer a trait (perhaps smartness),
which may then inﬂuence children’s subsequent
epistemic trust. In the current study, we took a
direct approach to assessing the inﬂuence of infor-
mants’ traits on children’s trust—we used a para-
digm in which characters were assigned trait labels,
the labeled traits were described, characters
behaved in accordance with their trait labels, and
children were reminded about the characters’ traits.
We found that children as young as 3 years of age,
tend to ask and endorse information provided by
smart informants rather than informants who are
not smart. We also found that preschoolers prefer
to ask and endorse information provided by infor-
mants who are nice—a less epistemically relevant
trait. Although 3-year-olds were as trusting of nice
informants as they were the other positive-trait
informants, children were not signiﬁcantly more
trusting of the nice (vs. mean) informant until 4
years, and overall children preferred to ask as
opposed to endorse the nice informant.
More novel, we assessed children’s sensitivity to
another trait that is of particular import when con-
sidering the quality of someone’s testimony—hon-
esty. The inﬂuence of informants’ honesty on
children’s knowledge acquisition has received sur-
prisingly little attention in the literature, with the
few available studies suggesting that children do
not begin to consider informants’ honesty until age
4 or later (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009; Vanderbilt
et al., 2011). However, using the same experimental
paradigm employed for the other traits—which
included two informants who provided conﬂicting
testimony—we found that children as young as
3 years of age also prefer to ask and endorse testi-
mony provided by honest (as opposed to dishonest)
informants. What likely accounts for discrepancies
between ﬁndings is that prior studies required that
children disregard information or instructions pro-
vided by a single informant, tasks that children
may have difﬁculty with regardless of informants’
speciﬁc traits (Jaswal et al., 2010; Reed et al., 1984;
Strommen, 1973). Thus, prior studies appear to
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have underestimated children’s consideration of
informants’ honesty. In general, informants’ traits—
especially smartness and honesty—can weigh
heavily when young children consider the quality
of testimony.
Thus, the current results demonstrate that others’
traits inﬂuence children’s epistemic trust. We dem-
onstrated this by pitting characters with traits of
contrasting valence—for example, mean versus nice—
against one another. With our procedures, it is
unclear whether children trusted positive-trait infor-
mants, distrusted negative-trait informants, or both.
Future studies could more meticulously assess the
driving forces behind the effects found for each of
the trait pairs. For example, positive- and negative-
trait informants can be pitted against neutral infor-
mants, to determine whether children’s responses
are driven entirely by the positive-trait informants,
entirely by the negative-trait informants, or by a
combination of the two.
One possible interpretation of our results is that
children chose informants and testimony based
upon a general characterization of the smart, hon-
est, and nice informants as equally positive, without
considering their particular traits. However, the
variability in 3-year-olds’ willingness to afﬁliate
with each of the six informants suggests that chil-
dren did not consider the three positive-trait infor-
mants one and the same. The afﬁliation data also
allowed us to examine relations between preschool-
ers’ testimony judgments and their more general
attraction or aversion to informants. Several studies
pitting accurate informants against inaccurate infor-
mants have demonstrated that children’s preference
for testimony cannot be attributed to children’s gen-
eral attraction to accurate informants (e.g., Birch
et al., 2008; Jaswal & Neely, 2006). The results of
the current study likewise demonstrate that a gen-
eral attraction to informants with certain traits is
not solely responsible for children’s trust in their
testimony. Over half of the 3-year-olds wanted to
be friends with the informant who was not smart,
yet they typically chose to ask and endorse infor-
mation provided by the smart informant. Moreover,
3-year-olds were equally willing to be friends with
the honest and dishonest informants, yet they pre-
ferred to ask the honest informant for information
and they favored his testimony; and children were
equally willing to trust information provided by the
honest informant regardless of whether they
wanted to be his friend. For all age groups,
decisions to afﬁliate with informants were uncorre-
lated with children’s endorsement of informants’
testimony, also indicating that a general desire to
afﬁliate was not solely responsible for children’s
trust in testimony. However, the afﬁliation ques-
tions and testimony questions had different formats—
for each pair, children could choose to be friends
with one, both, or neither of the informants, but
had to trust the testimony of just one informant. To
further examine relations between children’s afﬁlia-
tion preferences and trust in testimony, future stud-
ies can use a forced-choice format where children
choose to be friends with just one of the two infor-
mants.
An important focus of our research was chil-
dren’s consideration not only of informants’ traits
but of their knowledge as well. Here, our most
intriguing ﬁnding was that traits can inﬂuence the
very knowledge that young children attribute to
informants. Indeed, 3-year-olds overwhelmingly
used the valence of informants’ traits, rather than
informants’ perceptual access to relevant informa-
tion, to infer informants’ knowledge. This was true
for a trait that is often associated with the quality
of one’s knowledge (smartness) as well as two traits
that seem more morally relevant and less epistemi-
cally relevant (i.e., not typically associated the qual-
ity of individuals’ knowledge), honesty and
kindness. Only the oldest children (5- and 6-year-
olds) and adults consistently differentiated between
the valence of informants’ traits and the quality of
their knowledge. Thus, although 3- and 4-year-olds
are fully aware of the link between perceiving
information and knowing that information (e.g.,
Pratt & Bryant, 1990), they sometimes disregard
people’s perceptual access to information when
those people have certain traits, and instead (inac-
curately) use the valence of those traits to guide
epistemic inferences. Others’ traits carry great
inductive potential when considering their inten-
tions, emotions, and behavior (Heyman, 2009), and
young children appear to use trait information even
when reasoning about others’ knowledge.
In a study with seemingly contrasting results,
Brosseau-Liard and Birch (2010) found that 4-year-
olds did not attribute greater general knowledge
(e.g., knowledge of words) or situation-speciﬁc
knowledge (e.g., “Who knows where I put my
books?”) to a recently accurate character. Likewise,
Brosseau-Liard and Birch (2011) demonstrated that
preschoolers show no preference for the testimony
of accurate (vs. inaccurate) informants when both
informants report on the contents of a box that nei-
ther informant has looked in. The results of these
studies are likely a product of children only having
been given information about informants’ recent
accuracy (which may or may not reﬂect an
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underlying trait), rather than the rich and more
direct information that we provided about our
informants’ traits. Young children in particular have
difﬁculty predicting people’s future behavior based
upon their prior trait-related behavior, but can do
so when people are assigned trait labels (Heyman
& Gelman, 1999, 2000; Liu et al., 2007). We antici-
pated that this may also be the case with regard to
children’s use of trait information to guide their
epistemic trust and epistemic inferences. Thus, in
addition to engaging in trait-consistent behavior,
our informants were assigned trait labels and we
described to children what those labels meant.
Turning to our results on how children simulta-
neously consider informants’ knowledge access and
traits when trusting testimony, we found that chil-
dren who reported (incorrectly) that nice and hon-
est informants were knowledgeable about key
information (when in fact those informants had not
even perceived the information) tended to endorse
those informants’ testimony. In contrast, children
who understood that those informants were not
knowledgeable were less trusting of their testi-
mony. Intriguingly, a different pattern emerged for
the smart informant—children trusted his testimony
even when they understood that he was not knowl-
edgeable. Thus, when learning from others, young
children may weigh informants’ general intelligence
more strongly than informants’ speciﬁc knowledge,
especially in cases where a smart informant is
pitted against an informant who is not smart.
The early tendency to attribute knowledge to
individuals with positive qualities should be con-
sidered when interpreting other ﬁndings on young
children’s preference for certain informants’ testi-
mony. For example, Corriveau and Harris (2009)
demonstrated that 3- and 4-year-olds prefer to ask
and endorse information provided by teachers they
know well, and continue to trust these teachers
even if they had just provided inaccurate informa-
tion. It is not until age ﬁve that children prefer
information from unfamiliar yet accurate teachers.
Corriveau and Harris provide four potential inter-
pretations of their ﬁndings, and settle upon a “halo
effect” account—children judge familiar people as
positive on multiple dimensions, including likeabil-
ity, competence, and trustworthiness. Such a halo
effect may indeed be at work (see Brosseau-Liard
& Birch, 2010), and we would add that the quality
of informants’ knowledge (including situation-
speciﬁc knowledge) may be included within such a
halo.
Our data also lend support to a complementary
account of Corriveau and Harris’s (2009) results: given
extended experience with their teachers, children
appreciate that they possess certain traits, speciﬁcally
intelligence—teachers are typically knowledgeable,
provide accurate information, can ﬁgure out new
problems, and so on. As we argued earlier, young
children in particular require much detail about
someone’s tendencies in order to infer their traits,
and thus a few recent instances of the familiar tea-
cher’s inaccuracy may have not been enough infor-
mation for the youngest children to understand
that she possessed some fundamental cognitive
limitation, especially when they have so much
prior information about the familiar teacher’s
competence.
In summary, informants’ traits can factor
strongly into how young children seek and trust
testimony. Preschoolers prefer to ask and endorse
information provided by people who are nice,
smart, and honest, and this is especially the case for
the latter two traits. This preference increases
throughout the preschool years and is not attribut-
able to a more general desire to afﬁliate with posi-
tive-trait individuals. Moreover, these traits
inﬂuence the very knowledge that preschoolers
attribute to informants. In certain circumstances,
young children consider people with positive traits
to be knowledgeable even if they clearly do not
have access to relevant information. This misattri-
bution of knowledge decreases throughout the pre-
school years, but is still apparent in 5-year-olds. In
young children’s evaluation of testimony, infor-
mants’ epistemically relevant traits can weigh par-
ticularly heavily. Indeed, as one example, children
continue to trust the testimony of smart (over not
smart) informants even when they realize that such
informants lack key knowledge.
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Appendix
Informant Introductions
Look, Neal helps the boy carry the plant.     
Remember, Neal is nice.
This is Neal. Neal is a boy who does nice things
for people. Neal is nice. 
Here’s Neal at school. He is walking down the
hall. 
Nice
He walks by a boy carrying a plant. 
Mean
He walks by a boy carrying a plant.  
Look, Mike pushes the boy and his plant falls
on the floor and breaks.
Remember, Mike is mean.
This is Mike. Mike is a boy who does mean things
to people. Mike is mean. 
Here’s Mike at school. He is walking down the
hall. 
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THIS IS A FROG.
Sam says:  “This is a frog.”
Remember, Sam is smart.
Smart Not Smart
This is Sam. Sam is a boy who gives right
answers. Sam is smart.
Here’s Sam sitting at a table. Look at what’s
on the table.
This is Noah. Noah is a boy who gives wrong
answers. Noah is not smart.
Here’s Noah sitting at a table. Look at what’s
on the table.
THIS IS A HORSE.
Noah says:  “This is a horse.”
Remember, Noah is not smart.
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Tom says, “Yes.” Remember, Tom is truthful.
YES.
Tom’s Mom comes in the room and asks,
“Tom, did you break the window?” 
Look, Tom accidentally throws
the ball at the window and the
window breaks.
This is Tom. Tom is a boy who tells the
truth. Tom is truthful. Here’s Tom
throwing a ball in his house.
Honest Dishonest
Larry says, “No.” Remember, Larry is a liar.
NO.
Larry’s Mom comes in the room and asks,
“Larry, did you break the window?” 
Look, Larry accidentally throws
the ball at the window and the
window breaks.
This is Larry. Larry is a boy who tells
lies. Larry is a liar. Here’s Larry
throwing a ball in his house.
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